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practices and public policy as it was in retooling corporate management
over the last forty years. Between 1976 and the present, corporate
governance has changed from a managerial system that celebrated
stewardship of large business entities in accordance with the interests of
multiple stakeholders to a more circumscribed vision of business
enterprises as vehicles to enrich their owners. This shift in theory, law,
and practice has dismantled the consensus-based management practices
of the mid-twentieth century, replacing them with a much narrower
focus on short-term fluctuations in share price and out-sized bonuses for
the executives who engineer share price increases. The result is a
resurgence of two features of the corporate world that disappeared over
the previous half-century: boom-bust financial cycles and large-scale
financial fraud. This Article will argue that this result is a predictable
consequence of the change in executive incentives and only a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates a criminological perspective can
address the intrinsic temptation to use to the corporation as the weapon
of choice for those who would become rich at others’ expense.
A. Economists’ Contribution to the Corporate Debate
The corporate debate is being waged simultaneously in a number of
academic disciplines. Legal scholars focus on corporate law, but their
analysis of corporate law has been conducted in tandem with economists
almost from its inception. 1 During the Great Depression, progressives
influenced both the economic analysis and the corresponding policy
responses. 2 Starting in the seventies, however, the corporate debate in
economics and law has been increasingly dominated by neo-classical
scholars who favor a reductionist emphasis on share price and profit
maximization, blind adherence to the efficient markets hypothesis as a
justification for ignoring the distorting effects of concentrations in
power, and a reorientation of management objectives from the firm’s
multiple constituents—employees, consumers, community, among
others—to a single-minded focus on shareholders and short-term

1. Berle and Means’ classic work, after all, paired one of the leading corporate law scholars
of his era (Berle) with an economist (Means) and the economic documentation of the concentration
of power in a small number of individuals was central to the work. See ADOLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
2. John Kenneth Galbraith, writing in the sixties chronicled the positive effects of the
reforms. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971). The first
edition was published in 1967. See also C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social
Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77,
102 (2002).
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maximization of share price. 3 These ideological and scholarly changes
have been immensely successful in changing public and private policies,
practices, and institutions.
Economists, and therefore most legal scholars, asserted three
central policy propositions about corporate law. First, they posited that
the proper function of corporate officials is to maximize shareholder
value. 4 Second, they applauded economists’ proposals to solve the
“agency” problem by using modern executive compensation to “align”
the interests of the CEO with the shareholders’ interests. 5 Third, they
argued that corporate law in federal systems, such as the United States,
produced a beneficial competition for corporate chartering among the
states that ensured corporate law would be self-correcting and move
toward optimality. 6 If companies found that they could increase share
price, for example, by adopting a charter in Delaware, presumably they
would do so, and other states could be expected to respond by adopting
similar provisions, further increasing share prices in the other states. 7
These policy views spring from key assumptions about the world.
The paramount metaphor of agency cost economists and legal scholars is
social Darwinism—an evolutionary process in which “markets”—absent
government “interference”—produce a triumph of the fittest people,
institutions, and firms. 8
Their paramount motif is that the economic world is all about risk.
This means that their heroes have always been cowboys—”cowboy”
CEOs that they honor as “entrepreneurs” who embrace risk and find
ways to profit from it,9 particularly when it has meant bringing in
3. See generally GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA (2009).
4. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (academic, business, and governmental elites shared a consensus
“that ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class; the managers of
the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of
its shareholders; . . . and the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the principal
measure of its shareholders’ interests.”).
5. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 20.
6. Id. at 48.
7. Id. at 67, 176 (noting that some states and countries specialize in different laws attractive
to companies and that the competition for corporate friendly legal climates has become international
in scope). For a view disputing the conventional description of state competition, see Marcel Kahan
& Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
8. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 33. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002)
(describing management competition as a “tournament”).
9. The idea of risk in these critiques, when presented neutrally, often focuses on “risk
management,” including both excessive risk taking and complacency. See, e.g., George S. Geis,

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 6

374

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:371

external CEOs who increase share value by dismantling worker
protections and employee benefits. 10
Their attitude toward fraud is that, absent government
“interference,” it is episodic and unimportant because markets make it so
ephemeral. 11 Their fundamental paradox is that it is the traits despised
by the world’s major religions—greed and pride—that drive social
Darwinism to produce a world in which CEOs reliably act as if they care
about their customers and investors and to prevent fraud from becoming
material. 12
Legal scholars have debated each of these assertions, but prior to
Lehman’s failure, the extreme neo-classical economists, and legal
academics influenced by them, dominated the debates. 13 Judge Frank
Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel expressed their policy views
that favor the superiority of markets in deliberately stark terms. “[A] rule
against fraud is not an essential or even necessarily an important
ingredient of securities markets.” 14 Even today, when the limitations of
these theories are far more apparent, they retain their hold on corporate
management. 15
In the wake of the financial crisis, legal scholars have increasingly
questioned this dominant paradigm, 16 but what has been missing is a
criminological perspective.
B. Criminologists’ Contribution to the Debate
White-collar criminologists ask very different questions than proCEO economists and tend to favor very different policies. White-collar
Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 974 (2007).
Much of the neo-classical focus, however, has been the downsides of complacency and the failure to
take advantage of opportunities for shareholders that might risk management sinecures. See, e.g.,
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997)
(finding that when CEOs enjoyed a substantial ownership stake in the company, they became more
willing to entertain hostile bids or to resist acquisitions unlikely to produce a quick payoff).
10. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 90-91.
11. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 283-85 (1991).
12. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 3, at 7, 211 (referring to Adam Smith’s comment, which has
been interpreted to explain “how an invisible hand guided market participants to provide for the
well-being of others about whom they may care little”).
13. Indeed, prominent law review articles proclaimed that the debate was over. See
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4.
14. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11.
15. See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 397, 397 (2015) (rejecting the notion that the team production model is replacing agency
cost theory as a primary form of management).
16. Id. (discussing the team production model as a proposed new paradigm).
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criminologists have developed three key concepts that explain the fraud
epidemics that drive our recurrent, intensifying financial crises.
First, the frauds that drive our recurrent financial crises and cause
greater financial losses than all other forms of property crime—
combined—are “control frauds.” 17 A control fraud is a fraud in which
the persons controlling a seemingly legitimate entity use it as a
“weapon” to commit fraud. 18 The issue is control, not title, but for the
sake of brevity we use “CEO” rather than the phrase “the persons that
control the entity.” There are many forms of control fraud, but this
Article focuses on “accounting control fraud.” In finance, accounting is
the CEO’s “weapon of choice.” 19
Second, fraud becomes serious when policies create a
“criminogenic environment.” 20 The concept should be congenial to
economists and legal scholars influenced by economics, for it looks for
factors that create powerful, perverse incentives among CEOs and those
that aid and abet their crimes. 21 The truly dangerous criminogenic
environments produce epidemics of control fraud.
Third, CEOs can often produce criminogenic environments by
creating a “Gresham’s” dynamic in which “bad ethics drives good
ethics” out of the markets or professions. The economist George Akerlof
first identified the dynamic in his 1970 paper on markets for “lemons”
that led to his being made a Nobel Laureate in 2001.
[D]ishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the
market . . . . The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the
amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include
22
the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.

17. See William K. Black, Neo-Classical Economic Theories, Methodology, and Praxis
Optimize Criminogenic Environments and Produce Recurrent, Intensifying Crises, 44 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 597, 597-98 (2011).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 597.
20. See, e.g., Robert Tillman, Making the Rules and Breaking the Rules: The Political
Origins of Corporate Corruption in the New Economy, 51 CRIM. L. & SOC. CHANGE 73, 73 (2009)
(explaining why corporate environments have become “criminogenic”); see also William K. Black,
The Department of Justice “Chases Mice While Lions Roam the Campsite”: Why the Department
Has Failed to Prosecute the Elite Frauds That Drove the Financial Crisis, 80 UMKC L. REV. 987,
1019 (2012) (explaining the term).
21. Sally S. Simpson, Making Sense of White-Collar Crime: Theory and Research, 8 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 481, 492 (2011) (“Beginning with Sutherland, research consistently has shown that
some industries are more criminogenic than others and that structural characteristics—especially
those related to the political and economic environment of the market—are critical factors
associated with white-collar offending.”).
22. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and
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White-collar criminologists, as this Article explains, consider the
policies recommended by neo-classical economic theories to be a
leading cause of criminogenic environments. The views of
criminologists are the polar opposite of the dominant stream of
economists on the corporate debate. The paradox is that economists and
criminologists make the same core assumptions of generally selfinterested conduct and generally rational behavior by corporate officers
and employees—yet end up reaching the opposite conclusions. 23
The legal debate over corporate governance rarely references
criminological research or perspectives. 24 The critics of shareholder
primacy focus primarily on the model’s refusal to consider the interests
of other stakeholders, such as consumers or employees. 25 While those
who still defend shareholder primacy-use models assume that fraud is
trivial and quickly excluded by markets. 26 Yet, at a time of widespread
conviction that white-collar crime is pervasive and increasing, 27 this
critique has had no influence on public policies relevant to constraining
control fraud. 28
From a criminologist’s perspective, the criticism of “shareholder
primacy” was at best peripheral, for the accounting control frauds led by
CEOs frequently targeted the firm’s shareholders and creditors as their
principal victims. 29 Criminologists, very much like orthodox economists,
tend to make the assumption that CEOs will frequently pursue their selfinterest at the expense of the firm, its shareholders, and its creditors.
From the criminologist’s perspective, we should be so lucky that the

the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970).
23. For a recent example discussing differences in the use of the rational actor model, see
Mark Klock, Contrasting the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-Economic Nonsense: The
Distinction between Reasonable Assumptions and Ridiculous Assumptions, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 153
(2010).
24. The word “criminogenic,” however, seems to be making its way into the lexicon. See,
e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay for
Performance”, 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 555 (2014).
25. In this context, they do, however, discuss the negative implications for the corporation
that result from “short-termism.” See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis,
and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012).
26. Simpson, supra note 21, at 492 (contrasting criminologists’ views with “the idea (more
common in finance or economics) that markets will be self-correcting without intervention”).
27. See Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435,
446 (2014) (citing polls showing that more than half the public believes that financial crime
contributed to the economic crisis).
28. And some would argue, nor on corporate behavior more generally. See, e.g., Cheffins,
supra note 15 (contesting evidence of a paradigm shift in corporate behavior).
29. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of
Bankruptcy for Profit, 24 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (1993).
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CEO actually seeks to maximize shareholder value by honest means
rather than maximizing his or her interests by looting the firm’s
shareholders and creditors. 30 Criminologists believe that we suffer from
“CEO primacy” hiding behind illusory “shareholder primacy.” 31
This Article will bring together the legal, economic, and
criminological discussions of corporate governance with an emphasis on
the change in corporate cultures that has led to a new era of financial
scandals. Part II will describe how corporations can be weapons of
fraud. It will also revisit the managerial era of the fifties and sixties, a
remarkable period in which corporate scandal and financial booms and
busts largely disappeared. This section will also examine the rise of
shareholder primacy and its success in dismantling the most effective
restraints of the managerial era. Part III will consider the role
criminology could play in bringing back more effective (and more
honest) management practices. Part IV offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE FIRM AS A WEAPON
[T]he corporation is always a business concern, not an industrial
appliance. It is a means of making money, not of making goods. The
production of goods or services, wherever that sort of thing is included
among the corporation’s affairs, is incidental to the making of money
and is carried only so far as will yield the largest net gain in terms of
money,—all according to the principal of “what the traffic will bear,”
or of “balanced return,” which underlies all sound business, and more
particularly all corporation business.

30. Akerlof and Romer described the behavior as “looting,” which they described this way:
Once owners have decided that they can extract more from a firm by maximizing their
present take, any action that allows them to extract more currently will be attractive—
even if it causes a large reduction in the true economic net worth of the firm. A dollar in
increased dividends today is worth a dollar to owners, but a dollar in increased future
earnings of the firm is worth nothing because future payments accrue to the creditors
who will be left holding the bag.
Id. at 2. The “owners” to whom Akerlof and Romer referred were savings and loan owners, but the
same analysis applies to CEOs in a position to extract current bonuses based on increases in share
price.
31. As we will explain below, the change in the governance of corporations makes it easier
rather than harder for unscrupulous CEOs to misrepresent earnings, suborn internal controls, and
engage in other misconduct in order to increase their own profits at the expense of the companies’
long term health. Some shareholders may also gain in the short term, while other shareholders do
not. In this context, we use the term “CEO primacy” to mean management of the company to
maximize the CEO’s financial interest. Shareholder interests, in contrast, are incoherent because of
the potential conflict between current shareholders who sell in the short term (who may gain by the
CEO’s behavior) and future shareholders who may be left holding the bag.
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32

With the rise of industrialization came the need for larger systems
of managing people and production. The large, publically traded
corporation ultimately provided a large part of the answer to those
challenges. But the same traits that make large corporations useful for
raising capital and organizing workers also make it a potential vehicle
for the unscrupulous. Capitalism thus starts not just with the celebration
of the corporation but with a debate about whether it should exist at all.33
Co-existent with the corporation’s rise have been financial bubbles and
busts, large-scale frauds, and egregious behavior with large-scale
societal consequences. 34 The increased scale of business enterprises
increased the stakes for investors and communities. In response,
economists tend to focus on the upside—the potential upside from the
optimal operation of business entitles—while white-collar criminology
focuses on the downside. Indeed, white-collar criminology may be most
usefully defined by its examination of the role of the corporation as a
potential “weapon” that can be primed for criminal purposes. These two
perspectives should be thought of as opposite sides of the same coin,
echoing the reservations that have been with the corporation since its
inception. 35
Both are rooted in the same phenomena. England experimented
with corporate structure in the early days of industrialization, and it
quickly became associated with boom and bust financial scandals fueled
by “control fraud” and corruption, such as the South Sea Company that
so strongly influenced Adam Smith. 36 In The Wealth of Nations, Adam
32. Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1317, 1338-39 (2011) citing to THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA 85 (A.M. Kelly 1964) (1923).
33. See, e.g., Harwell Wells,”Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 305, 314 (2013) (“In the 1890s, Americans vigorously debated whether there should be
large corporations at all, and if they should be allowed to exist, how they were to be prevented from
harming constituencies, such as communities and small competitors.”).
34. In the United States, this was particularly true during an era called “finance capitalism,”
which dominated the American economy from the late 1890’s through the early thirties. In
describing the opposition to this movement, Gerald Davis observes, “Faceless monopolies were bad
enough, but faceless monopolies controlled by a handful of bankers in New York were worse still.”
DAVIS, supra note 3, at 68.
35. See Stanton Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The Organization as Weapon in WhiteCollar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403 (1982).
36. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 8, 28 (noting that because of
the risks of corruption, prominent underwriters refused until the end of the nineteenth century to
underwrite the common stock of industrial corporations).
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Smith wrote that the directors of such companies, “being the managers
rather of other people’s money than of their own,” cannot be expected to
“watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners
in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own . . . . Negligence
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail.” 37
Smith’s pessimism came from his recognition that the advantages
and disadvantages of corporations come from the suppression rather than
the vindication of market mechanisms. The advantages include:
(1) The separation of ownership and control, with the ability to raise
capital from a large number of shareholders dispersing risk; 38
(2) The unlimited life of the corporation, which includes the ability to
transfer ownership of the shares and/or management of the company
without liquidating the enterprise, facilitating long term planning; 39
(3) The ability to secure supply chains and a trained labor force as part
of a coordinated structure that does not depend on fluctuating market
conditions. 40

Corresponding to these advantages are increased opportunities for
mischief that come from:
(1) The separation of ownership and control, with those making
corporate decisions unlikely to bear the financial consequences of
those decisions;
(2) The attenuation of moral responsibility: a local shopkeeper bears
personal responsibility for shoddy products or ruthless employment
practices while Donald Trump casually dismisses the bankruptcy of
companies he owns as mere business decisions that have no bearing on
his individual moral worth; 41
(3) The ability to disguise what is really taking place, through complex
or hard to follow transactions (e.g., derivatives), arcane corporate

37. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
741 (Glasgow ed. 1976) (emphasis added).
38. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 387 (2003) (The ability to lock in
investors’ capital was the primary advantage over other business forms.).
39. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of
Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 885 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and
Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 320 (1993).
40. Blair, supra note 38, at 398-99.
41. And, indeed, the public may never have associated Trump or the executives under him
with bankrupt companies, employment decisions, or particular business practices but for his
decision to run for President.
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structures (e.g., offshore subsidiaries), or disingenuous accounting that
disguises a company’s financial health;
(4) The capacity to manipulate timing, for example, increasing shortterm earnings at the expense of a firm’s long term prospects.

The tradeoffs between the advantages and disadvantages of
corporate organization are amplified by the interaction with the financial
system. If the sole purpose of a firm were to make goods, then the
question of debt versus equity financing, use of derivatives, or exotic
financial instruments might be an abstract academic exercise—or an
immediately practical one. If instead, as Veblen suggested at the turn of
the last century, the primary purpose of a firm is to make money, then
the financial structure of the firm may be as important to its success as
its productive capacity. 42 And in every era, the financial realm may offer
more temptations to shave corners than the brick and mortar realm for
the reasons noted above: the lack of an executive financial stake, the
attenuation of moral responsibility, the lack of transparency, and the
temporal separation between actions and consequences. All of these
factors pose greater risks with the integration of production and finance.
Given these risks, and the considerable benefits of corporate
structure, much of the literature on business associations deals with the
issue of the proper incentives: how to align management and shareholder
interests, how to deter fraudulent or criminal activity, and how to protect
public interests in the operation of important economic sectors such as
energy or transportation, the safety of workers and consumers, and the
maintenance of efficient markets. The harder issue to assess is the
creation of particular ethoses. Why did financial fraud lead to the Great
Depression, the savings and loan debacle, and the recent financial crisis,
while it is hard to point to similarly consequential business frauds
between the thirties and the eighties? Even looking at just a single time
period, why do some corporations, Enron 43 or Lehman Brothers, 44
embody the worst of their eras while other companies responding to
similar incentives do not?
The answer that any student of business ethics will supply is the
importance of company leadership and certainly the management
literature emphases on the importance of executive vision and wisdom.
42. See VEBLEN, supra note 32.
43. See, e.g., James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 448-49 (2004) (explaining culture of Enron).
44. See Black, supra note 17, at 1009 (describing Lehman practices leading to financial
crisis).
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Yet, in looking at the broad changes across different eras, the question of
the alignment of interests remains controversial. How do we understand
executive motivation?
The answer may be that the relationship between executive and
entity is fluid, framed in broad strokes by the surrounding legal culture,
the role of finance, the nature of commercial competition, and the
executive’s relationship to his or her own firm. These factors have
changed in dramatic ways across different eras.
A. The Managerial Era 45 and the CEO as Steward
Modern corporations had almost guaranteed workers and executives
permanent employment, but this meant that “membership in the
modern corporation becomes the single strongest social force shaping
its career members in the whole hierarchy above the production line.”
—Harwell Wells

46

Large-scale corporate fraud, particularly the type of financial frauds
that threaten entire economies, largely disappeared in the United States
from the Great Depression to the 1980s. 47 This occurred with a
fundamental reorientation of the purposes of large institutions and the
basis for the selection of their leadership. 48
1. American Post-War Dominance and the Rise of the Managerial
Era
The post-war era that ran from 1945 into the mid-seventies now
looks like an anomaly. The United States emerged from World War II as
the only major industrial power whose economy had not been devastated
by the war. By itself, the United States constituted the world’s wealthiest
market, with few internal barriers to commerce. 49 American companies
45. Modern corporate law scholars use “managerialism” to cover “any theory of the
corporation that presents the corporation as a hierarchical entity run by managers with loyalties
running chiefly to the corporation rather than shareholders.” See Wells, supra note 33, at 310. Wells
prefers the term “heroic managerialism” to describe the immediate post-war era’s optimism about
the potential of enlightened managers able to govern in accordance with technocratic principles. Id.
46. See Wells, supra note 33, at 324.
47. See, e.g., Cheffins, supra note 15, at 404 (noting that serious corporate scandals were
“happily, rare”).
48. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 71-77.
49. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values
and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 698-99 (2004) (“After World War II and the Korean
War, the United States was the single, unchallenged economic superpower in the world. Large
American corporations were without equal foreign competitors in many markets.”).
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thus had access to a large domestic market, expanding global
opportunities, and relatively little international competition.50 In
retrospect, “the period from the end of the war to the late 1960s seems
an economic golden age.” 51
Looking back, however, the period is also anomalous because of
the conditions produced by government policies. Income inequality
during this period reached a nadir, declining dramatically from the
inequality of the “robber baron” era of early industrialization. 52 The
same companies that dominated U.S. markets in 1900 still did so in
1960, and most of the largest companies—in 1900 or 1960—were either
part of cartel-like groups with large barriers to entry (big auto, big steel)
or government regulated utilities (General Electric, Ma Bell). 53
The period is also an anomaly in terms of corporate governance.
Known as the “Managerial Era,” it was a period that celebrated
technocratic management. 54 As Lynn Stout observes, “[C]orporate
directors and professional executives—who usually worked for fixed
fees and owned relatively little stock in the company—viewed
themselves as stewards or trustees charged with guiding a vital social
and economic institution in the interests of a wide range of
beneficiaries”; they did not see themselves merely as the agents of
shareholders, nor did they see their interests as defined primarily in
terms of the size of their paychecks or their bonuses. 55
By the seventies, an era of “malaise” produced by OPEC driven
rises in oil prices, Vietnam era inflation, and the high interest rates
designed to cure it, this management system came under attack. Today,
however, a revisionist literature suggests that the system outperformed
50. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 317 (perception of greater isolation from competition on multiple
fronts).
51. Wells, supra note 33, at 316.
52. Id. (“Between 1945 and 1973, real per capita income doubled, and to a great extent this
new wealth was spread widely, as wage inequality fell sharply in the 1940s and did not begin to
increase significantly again until the 1970s.”). See also Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The
Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1
(1992) (documenting compression in wages).
53. “As Alfred Chandler showed, many of the corporations that grew to industrial dominance
by the 1910s held their commanding positions into the 1970s, which suggested that competition was
not alive and well in the upper reaches of the economy. Defense spending effectively sponsored
many industries, which operated less in an environment of fierce competition than as part of an
‘administered economy,’ with steady profits guaranteed by cost-plus contracts. Other industries,
including railroads, airlines, finance, and energy production, were so heavily regulated that
competition there, too, was muted at best.” Wells, supra note 33, at 318.
54. Id. at 310.
55. Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2013).
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its successor, not just in terms of the greater public or employee good, 56
but in terms of returns to shareholders. 57 Between 1933, and the
beginning of the New Deal, and 1976, the beginning of the assault on
managerialism, the S&P 500 produced real compound average annual
returns for shareholders of 7.5%. 58 After 1976, this average dropped to
6.5%, 59 and it fell further after 2000. Since 1980, bonds have arguably
outperformed stocks as investments for the first time in nearly 150
years. 60
The idea of technocratic management is often attributed to Berle
and Means. They wrote that in the 1930s the most dominant corporations
had power akin to a principality—or the medieval church in Europe. 61 In
response, managers needed to take into account a broader set of
considerations, and the authors predicted that they could ultimately be
expected to evolve into a “purely neutral technocracy, balancing a
variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning each
a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than
private cupidity.” 62 By the 1950s, observers, including Adolf Berle,
agreed that this was exactly what had taken place. 63 The transformation
happened because as corporations became even more powerful and
influential than they had been in the early part of the century, their
CEO’s social standing came to a much greater degree from their
association with the institution.64 The “corporation man” at mid-century,
even in the position of CEO of a behemoth industrial organization, did
not have the larger than life stature of an entrepreneurial Henry Ford nor,
like hedge fund managers of today, could they walk away from a top

56. See, e.g., Robert Reich, What Happened to the Moral Center of American Capitalism?,
READER SUPPORTED NEWS (Sept. 5, 2015), http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/32223what-happened-to-the-moral-center-of-american-capitalism.
57. Stout, supra note 55, at 1178-79.
58. ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM
CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 63 (2011).
59. Id.
60. Stout, supra note 55, at 1178-79 (citing Cordell Eddings, Say What? In 30-Year Race,
Bonds Beat Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1031/bonds-beating-u-s-stocks-over-30-years-forfirst-time-since-19th-century.html).
61. Wells, supra note 33, at 314.
62. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 356.
63. See Wells, supra note 33, at 327 (Berle spoke of “modern directors who were no longer
limited to running business enterprises for maximum profit, but are in fact . . . administrators of a
community system.”).
64. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 91-92 (describing the passage of the corporation from the
entrepreneur as individual to management by the “technostructure”); id. at 178 (noting that esteem
is associated with successful corporations, not with individuals).
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executive perch with millions in stock options. 65 Instead, they associated
success with the rise up the corporate ladder at a single institution, and
the higher they rose, the more they associated their own prestige with
that of the institution they managed. 66 That prestige rested less on shortterm corporate earnings than on longer-term growth and the approval of
technocratic peers. 67
Aside from bragging rights about earnings, the difference between
the two eras involves fundamental differences in the definitions of
corporate purposes and of the role of the CEO in managing them.
Central to those differences is the concept of the firm as an entity; that
is, of the large business enterprise as something more than the sum of its
parts. 68 This sense of the firm is critical to the idea of stewardship; a
CEO cannot have an obligation to something that is no more than a
fiction. This idea of managerialism thus depends both on the idea of the
firm as having interests greater than a reductive notion of the company’s
worth as no more than the current value of its share price and of a CEO
having an obligation to shepherd the company’s interests in accordance
with some idea greater than fealty to shareholder interests.69 Today’s
critics celebrate managerialism’s superiority to today’s system of
shareholder supremacy, but without agreement on the obligations that
gave the system its potency. 70 In this analysis, we focus on the factors
that reduce use of the corporation to enrich its owners and managers at
the expense of other parties.
2. The Managerial CEOs
The managerial period thus differed from management of large
business enterprises before and since by the degree to which the CEO
measured personal success in terms of something other than personal
earnings and financial stature and sought to govern the company in

65. Stout, supra note 55.
66. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 153-55.
67. Id. at 117 (Competitive avarice “is not the sort of thing that a good company man does; a
remarkably effective code bans such behavior.”).
68. See, e.g., Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM.
ECON. REV. 311, 313 (1957) (Management, no longer constrained by fierce competition or the need
for outside capital, “sees itself as responsible to stockholders, employees, customers, the general
public, and, perhaps most important, the firm itself as an institution.”).
69. For a more recent description of the role of firm identity in motivating workers, see
GEORGE AKERLOF & RACHEL KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR
WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010).
70. For a summary of the challenges to the shareholder primacy ideal, see Cheffins, supra
note 15, at 422.
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accordance with notions broader than earnings or profits. 71 The system
was able to do so as a result of the confluence of a number of factors.
Certainly the mindset of the generation that emerged from the
Depression and World War II was part of the answer. The Depression
had discredited the extraordinary bonuses and executive pay of the
1920s. Indeed, the single most shocking revelation in the hearings
investigating the causes of the Great Depression was the $1 million a
year in income the CEO of National City Bank commanded. 72 Outsized
salaries and bonuses became associated with corporate malfeasance, not
capitalist success. 73
Moreover, the economy did not fully recover from the Depression
until World War II, and during the war, price controls and moral
sanction limited pay increases more generally. 74 While the formal
restraints ended after the war, the sense that extraordinarily high
compensation was “unseemly” remained. 75 This may have been
reinforced by the fact that high marginal tax rates, which increased
initially because of outrage at the excesses of the twenties and which
stayed high through the war and its aftermath, made salary increases less
effective as a way to produce immediate wealth.76 It was certainly
reinforced by the securities laws of the thirties, which mandated
disclosure of executive compensation. 77 It may also be true, however,
because corporate successes were seen less as the product of an
enterprising individual or a revolutionary approach than of collective
efforts. 78 Indeed, John Galbraith, in his description of the management
71. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 116 (on relatively modest nature of executive compensation).
72. See, e.g., Harwell Wells, ”No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight Over
Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 714 (2010).
73. In Rogers v. Hill, the Supreme Court cited with approval a lower court opinion observing
that million-dollar compensation packages were “so much beyond fair compensation for services as
to make a prima facie showing that the corporation is giving away money.” 289 U.S. 582, 591-92
(1933) (citing Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1932)).
74. Indeed, “during the 1940s executive compensation at public corporations actually fell,
and while it rose afterwards, from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s it grew at a sluggish 0.8% a
year. Wells, supra note 72, at 758-59.
75. Id. at 758, 762.
76. See, e.g., id. at 750 (“In 1930, an executive working in New York City making $300,000
a year would have taken home approximately $241,000; by 1940, the same salary would have
yielded an after-tax income of only about $111,000.”).
77. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 119.
78. See, e.g., Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 129, 161 (2003), observing that:
The Great Depression brought about a vision of large businesses as entrenched
behemoths whose destinies were largely independent of anyone’s individual actions. The
academic view largely mirrored that of the general public, which was that large
businesses in the 1950s were faceless bureaucratic organizations where the guiding
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practices of the era, even lauded the idea of management by committee,
writing that:
Thus decision in the modern business enterprise is the product not of
individuals but of groups . . . . Each contains the men possessed of the
information, or with access to the information, that bears on the
particular decision together with those whose skill consists in
extracting and testing this information and obtaining a conclusion. This
is how men act successfully on matters where no single one, however
exalted or intelligent, has more than a fraction of the necessary
79
knowledge.

Galbraith maintained further that as executives acted in groups, they had
to be able to depend on each other, and because they knew each other’s
thoughts, actions, and levels of compensation, they could enforce
personal codes of conduct. He concluded that the technostructure
depended on a high standard of personal honesty and “as a matter of
necessity, bans personal profit-making.” 80
The collectivist notions of the era treated management decisionmaking as part of a technostructure or as products of organization men. 81
Job tenure lengthened, and top management ranks tended to work their
way up corporate ladders. 82 Compared to today, CEOs were more likely
to stay with a single company for their entire careers, be selected from
within corporate ranks, and to hold their positions for longer periods. 83

principle was not individual initiative but conformity at all costs, and the leaders of such
enterprises, when not actively involved in stifling creativity among their subordinates,
were buffoons . . . . In all of these [academic and management] models, the character and
individual decision-making ability of the CEO are much less important than other
industry and firm-specific factors.
79. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 64.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. at 65, 117 (referring to “good company man”).
82. Id. at 94-95 (noting that of executives at the largest industrial and retail firms, three out of
four had been with their firms for more than twenty years and that two-thirds of CEOs at a selection
of large firms had also been with the same firm for more than twenty years).
83. See, e.g., DRAKE BEAM MORIN, CEO TURNOVER AND JOB SECURITY: A SPECIAL
REPORT 6 (2000). Between 1984 and 2000, the number of CEOs who had been in office for three
years or fewer rose from 33% to 45%, while the number of CEOs in office ten years or
more declined from 35% to 15%. Id. at 9, Table 4. Average Tenure of CEOs Declined to 8.4 Years,
the Conference Board Reports, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 12, 2012, http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/average-tenure-of-ceos-declined-to-84-years-the-conference-board-reports-147152135.html
(Between 2000 and 2011, CEO tenure declined from about 10 years to 8.4.); Snyder, supra note 78,
at 163 (“During the 1980s, boards (at the behest of powerful institutional investors) fired up to 50%
of the CEOs at America’s largest companies. In search of greater shareholder profits, these boards
got caught up in what Khurana calls ‘messianic mania,’ turning away from competent but dull
insiders to motivating, flamboyant leaders who would lead the firm to spectacular growth.”).
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This increased with their identification with the particular company,
their internalization of its ethos, and their concern for its long-term wellbeing—or some would argue—its size, growth, and stability rather than
its short-term earnings or share prices.84 Galbraith emphasized that,
while all workers tended to identify with companies during this era, “[a]s
one moves through these inner circles, identification and adaptation
become increasingly important;” that is, as one reached top
management, the identification with the firm became an increasingly
critical factor for the exercise of discretion.85
Top management saw itself as loyal to the institution and saw the
institution as a citizen within a larger polity. 86 Rather than seeing the
interests of management and labor, private business and government,
sellers and buyers as antagonist, this generation of managers saw them
as interdependent; they were all in it together.87 This mindset came
partly from the times; World War II gave way to the Cold War, and the
triumph of American business in not only supplying superior arms, but
also in better meeting the needs of the electorate was an important part
of the country’s competition with the Soviet Union. 88 Many observers
today reduce the managerial era to the idea that corporate leaders
thought of themselves as responsible to multiple stakeholders, such as
employees, customers, and communities. 89 But this misses the nature of
the decision-making of the era. The managerial era did not seek the
maximization of any single end, not even maximization of the collective
interests of different corporate stakeholders, at least not in a reductionist
sense. Instead, it involved a sense of stewardship of the firm accordance
with a more holistic sense of institutional well-being. Galbraith argued
that these management principles came from:
(1) Group based decision-making as the critical factor necessary to
large firms; the best decisions resulted from the combination of
90
expertise and exchange; they could not be imposed from above;
(2) The identification of those engaged in discretionary decision84. Some argue it also tended to increase CEO concern about company size rather than
profits. See, e.g., Charles W.L. Hill & Phillip Phan, CEO Tenure as a Determinant of CEO Pay, 34
ACAD. MGMT. J. 707, 715 (1991) (“[A]s tenure grows the relationship between pay and firm size
and between pay and firm risk becomes stronger and the relationship between pay and stock returns
becomes weaker.”).
85. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 153.
86. Wells, supra note 33, at 327.
87. Id. at 319-20 (describing post-war politics of consensus).
88. Id. at 310, 320.
89. Id. at 329-30.
90. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 70.
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making with the firm, and their perception that their individual
91
interests and the firm’s interests were aligned;
(3) Consistency between the perceived goals of the firm and the larger
goals of society, which is another way of restating Charles Wilson’s
famous proclamation that as the CEO of General Motors, he had
believed for years that “what’s good for General Motors is good for the
92
America”; and
(4) Sufficient size to secure the autonomy of the decision-making
process, both in terms of its independence from government and other
93
external parties and its ability to secure its own survival.

Ironically, in Galbraith’s analysis, as firms became more powerful,
management felt more compelled to exercise that power on behalf of the
public good, and management’s ability to do so corresponded with their
relative insulation from competitive pressures, the need to raise capital
from external sources, and external interference in their business
decisions. 94 In a system that minimized the role of pecuniary motivations
and internal competition, the era produced a high degree of corporate
honesty and social consciousness. Large-scale corporate scandals and
boom-bust financial cycles largely disappeared.
B. The Agency Cost Era and the CEO as Capitalist
These executives are hyper-motivated survivors of a highly
competitive tournament . . . who have proven their ability to make
money while putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm. At least some
of the new breed appear to be Machiavellian, narcissistic,
prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral
distractions, willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to
lie when things turn bad, and nurtured by a corporate culture that
instills loyalty to insiders, obsession with short-term stock price, and

91. Id. at 153 (describing the prerequisites for individual identification with the firm).
92. Id. at 161. For the Wilson quote, see MORRELL HEALD, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF BUSINESS: COMPANY AND COMMUNITY, 1900-60, 276 n.8 (1970) (quoting Excerpts from Two
Wilson Hearings Before Senate Committees on Defense Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1953,
at 8).
93. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 167-69.
94. Harwell Wells summarizes the observations that corporations at mid-century were unique
not just because of their size, but because they were competing in oligopolistic or highly regulated
markets and were insulated from intensive competitive pressures. Capable of generating capital
internally, they also were independent of capital markets. Buffered from external controls, the
largest firms resembled independent states: they could command an army of employees, determine
what to produce, set prices, direct scientific progress, decide which communities received new
investment, and even set the rate of capital expansion. Wells, supra note 2, at 102.
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intense distrust of outsiders.
—Larry Ribstein

95

The agency cost era, that is, the era that began with economic
assault on corporate governance, dismantled the elements that brought
CEOs, institutions, and society into an apparent alignment of interests.
This dismantling is almost certainly a product of the intersection of
ideology, changing market conditions, and the increased power of
finance, making it difficult to untangle cause and effect. The net result,
however, is to recast large firms in very different terms from the firms of
the managerial era. Top executives, rather than model fealty to
institutional views, represent external constituents such as shareholders.
The interests of the firm, rather than reflecting its role as a societally
significant actor answerable to multiple constituencies, have been
reduced to short-term share prices alone. The firm, rather than seen as an
autonomous actor freed from the immediate pressure of competitors and
financial markets, is now seen as a less powerful actor subjected to them.
And the concept of the firm itself, as an institution capable of defining
identity and compelling loyalty, has disappeared from view.
1. Ideology and the Remaking of Corporate Governance
The remaking of large firms is almost certainly a product of a
confluence of events. During the mid-seventies, the American economy
hit hard times, with Dow Jones Industrial Average losing nearly half its
value, due in part to the OPEC oil embargo and high rates of inflation.96
By this point as well, other industrialized nations, which had rebuilt after
the devastation of World War II, were now making inroads into
American markets, particularly in critical industries such as auto and
steel. 97
Moreover, the executives climbing corporate ladders in the
seventies and eighties were no longer the cautious organization men
shaped by the Depression and World War II. The new generation
coming of age during the relatively secure fifties and sixties felt less
constrained by bureaucratic regularities and, inside corporations and
without, were more eager to shake things up. 98
95. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 9.
96. Stout, supra note 55, at 1172-73.
97. Indeed, Galbraith in the eighties admitted that he had underestimated the need to deal
with foreign competition. See John Kenneth Galbraith, Time and the New Industrial State, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 373 (1988).
98. Galbraith further confessed to giving insufficient weight to the “sclerotic” tendencies of
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Perhaps the most influential piece encouraging them to do so was
Jensen and Meckling’s “The Theory of the Firm.” 99 This article denied
the central importance of the firm itself as a factor determining
objectives and motivating behavior. They wrote:
Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships
among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization
of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be the
objective function of the firm,” or “does the firm have a social
responsibility” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It
is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in
which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may
“represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a
framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the
firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the outcome of a complex
equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the
wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by
thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations
100
and intentions.

Dismissing the corporation as an entity important in itself allowed
the new group of theorists to address the question of which people were
the real parties in interest. Their answer was the shareholders who
“owned” the corporation, 101 and they therefore returned to the work of
Berle and Means to say that the central problem of corporate governance
was the conflict between managers and shareholders, given the risk that
the mangers would seek to advance their own interests at the expense of
the corporation’s owners. 102 The new school of thought was labelled
“agency-cost” theory since they cast the problem in terms of the use of
non-owner managers to run corporate entities. 103 In the managerial era,
bureaucracies to multiply themselves, growing unnecessarily and replicating that which had always
been done. Id. at 376.
99. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
100. Id. at 311.
101. Lynn Stout objects, however, that “[s]hareholders cannot own corporations because
corporations are legal entities that own themselves. What shareholders really own is a contract with
the corporation, called a ‘share of stock,’ which carries very limited rights. Similarly, corporations
are their own residual claimants, with boards of directors enjoying the legal discretion to either
retain the residual or use it to benefit many different groups, including not just shareholders but also
creditors, employees, customers, and the community.” Stout, supra note 55, at 1174.
102. Finance economists claim that shareholders are the ultimate “owners” and sole “residual
claimants” in corporations, which implies that economic efficiency is served when corporate
directors and executives maximize “shareholder wealth” (typically measured by stock price).
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 36-37.
103. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 9, at 959 (“[I]t is now well established that the separation of
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these agents were seen as superior to shareholders and entrepreneurs in
their ability to balance competing interests; 104 in the new era, they were
seen as complacent shirkers, unwilling to seize opportunities for the
corporation that might threaten their comfortable sinecures. 105 The abuse
that had concerned Berle and Means, however, was the existence of
control blocks that used corporate structure to fleece the great mass of
powerless individual shareholders, a group that had grown dramatically
during the stock market bubble of the twenties. 106 The agency cost
theorists, however, were far more concerned about such abuses as
overuse of the corporate jet, excessive compensation, rejection of hostile
takeover bids that might change the company (and worse, the
management), 107 and the failure to dismantle the caution and
bureaucracy they associated with the managerial era.108
Ironically, for a group supposedly worried about excessive
compensation, 109 the solution was to better align management interests
with shareholders through changing executive compensation to rely
more on bonuses, typically in the form of stock options. 110 In addition,
the theorists sought to end large firms’ relative insulation from market
pressures by invigorating the market for corporate control,111
encouraging more of a mix of equity and debt financing, and otherwise
tying measures of firm health to the thing of greatest interest to

ownership and control can unleash a wide variety of bad manager behavior, such as shirking, lavish
compensation, entrenchment, and excessive risk-taking—collectively referred to as agency costs.”).
104. Indeed, Galbraith has described shareholders as the group with the greatest emphasis on
monetary incentives and the least identification with the firm’s identity and mission. Galbraith,
supra note 97.
105. Geis, supra note 9, at 959.
106. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 46. Indeed, one commentator of the period observed
that ”the fat boys, no longer content with their ancient perquisite of milking the public, are now
engaged in the dizzy and lofty job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!” Stuart Chase,
Editorial, Professor Quixote, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1927, at 264.
107. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Corporate Finance, the Theory of the
Firm, and Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 101 (1998); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 9
(finding that when CEOs enjoyed a substantial ownership stake in the company, they became more
willing to entertain hostile bids or to resist acquisitions unlikely to produce a quick payoff).
108. Geis, supra note 9, at 974 (identifying agency costs with “at least four broad areas of
concern: (1) insufficient effort or shirking; (2) lavish compensation or self-dealing; (3)
entrenchment; and (4) poor risk management”).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An
Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311-12 (1988); David I. Walker, Evolving Executive
Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting, 64 VAN. L. REV. 611, 618 (2011).
111. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978).
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shareholders: stock price. 112
A powerful coalition embraced the proposals. In economics, in
particular, the new theories quickly became orthodoxy. 113 As Galbraith
explained, assuming that managers seek to maximize profits “simplifies
the economists’ lives.” 114 Profit maximization is a precise standard;
balancing different interests is not. 115 Its reductionist nature makes it
relatively easy to model economic behavior through the use of equations
and sophisticated statistical techniques. 116 Evaluating how well corporate
managers balance interests or serve the corporation’s long term interests,
on the other hand, is a more difficult undertaking that may be impossible
to quantify. 117 Academic theorists accordingly embraced this theory as
“an elegant and seemingly scientific explanation of corporations that fit
nicely into the law and economics methodology that, beginning in the
1980s, had begun to dominate elite law schools.” 118
For lawyers from the time of the iconic Berle-Means debate of
1930 forward, the corporate management debate had two unsatisfying
alternatives: recognize corporations as serving multiple constituencies
and defer to management determinations of corporate purposes or give
weight to shareholder primacy as the corporation’s sole legally
enforceable obligation. 119 For economists, the issue went deeper. It is not
112. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4.
113. See id. at 440-41; see also Stout, supra note 55, at 1178 (“Shareholder primacy became
dogma: an omnipresent belief system that was seldom questioned, rarely justified, and so widely
accepted that many of those who embraced it could not even recall when they first encountered it.”).
114. Galbraith, supra note 2, at 129.
115. Indeed, Jensen maintained that:
What is commonly known as stakeholder theory, while not totally without content, is
fundamentally flawed because it violates the proposition that any organisation must have
a single-valued objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational behaviour . . . . It is
logically impossible to maximise in more than one dimension at the same time . . . .
[T]elling a manager to maximise [several objectives] leaves the managers with no
objective. The result will be confusion and lack of purpose that will fundamentally
handicap the firm in its competition for survival.
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 7 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 297, 300-01 (2001).
116. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 3, at 51 (describing management studies tied to share price).
117. See Licht, supra note 49, 707 (Calling on management to take the interests of all
constituencies into account “is essentially vacuous, because it allows management to justify almost
any action on the grounds that it benefits some group.”).
118. Stout, supra note 55, at 1174.
119. Compare E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1932) (arguing that corporations should be seen as having obligations to
multiple stakeholders), with A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367-68 (1932) (responding that obligations to multiple parties would
make fiduciary duties unenforceable). See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 440-41
(concluding that the debate had been finally settled).
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just that economists could not model, in elegant equations, the
managerial era’s vision of the corporation as a social institution
accountable to multiple stakeholders. Instead, they either did not see the
invisible threads that tied together executives in large corporations as
part of a shared enterprise, or to the extent that they did see them, they
saw the threads as bureaucratic constraints that stood in way of
efficiency and progress. Even in the sixties, Galbraith wrote of the
economists’ resistance to the very idea of non-maximizing values that
stood apart from market-driven profits as a measure of value. 120
Today, we also see the two sides (those favoring reductionist,
share-priced centered measures that validate existing hierarchies versus
those who favor broader, multi-faceted obligations that balance the
interests of multiple constituencies) in terms of cognitive styles, with
those favoring certainty and hierarchy on one side and those comfortable
with ambiguity and preferring equality on the other. 121 This makes
corporate theory a site of ideological division. However, it also has
remade the interest-based relationships associated with business entities,
separating the interests of shareholders and management from those of
other stakeholders.
2. The CEO as shareholder
Perhaps the most consequential change to come from the new
movement was the change in the role of the CEO. A shift in the nature of
executive compensation was instrumental in the change. 122 Executive
compensation, which in the managerial era had not been particularly
generous, became dramatically more so. 123 Between 1980 and 1994, use
of stock options grew by 683%, with the average grant to the top
executive rising from $155,000 to $1.2 million 124 and continuously
growing after that. Between 1993 and 2014, the percentage of CEO
compensation attributable to incentive pay increased from 35% to
120. Galbraith, supra note 2.
121. Licht, supra note 49.
122. The other major factor was the wave of corporate takeovers in the eighties, fueled by the
Reagan Administration’s changes in anti-trust policy. That wave ended, however, in the nineties
without a major shift in corporate behavior or practices, so we will not discuss it here. It nonetheless
contributed to the shake-up in management attitudes as companies whose share prices were seen as
low or underperforming became takeover targets. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 84-86 (describing the
effect as a corporate “bust-up” that shocked corporate America and contributed to the instantiation
of shareholder primacy).
123. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 25, at 320-21.
124. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2002).
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85%. 125 During the same period, average worker pay stagnated. 126 By
2013, the pay ratio between CEOs and average wage workers was 331:1
and the pay ratio between CEOs and minimum wage workers was
774:1. 127 Executive compensation increased dramatically, and as the
value in executive stock options fluctuated in accordance with share
price, their personal interests corresponded more closely with those of
shareholders—and less so with those of other corporate stakeholders. 128
The change in compensation was not the only factor changing
executive perspectives. In the managerial era, executives typically spent
their entire lives at a single corporation. In the new era, companies
“increasingly sought outside CEOs rather than promoting them from
within.” 129 During the same period, management tenure declined, 130 and
CEOs faced greater risk of dismissal, particularly if share prices did not
increase, than they had during the managerial era. 131
The combination of winner-take-all compensation systems, in
which top performers earned outsized bonuses, shorter employment
tenure, and greater insecurity succeeded in changing management
orientation. It also undermined the links between executives and firms.
Larry Ribstein described the emergence of a new breed of executives
who are the “hyper-motivated survivors of a highly competitive
tournament.” 132 These executives, socialized to believe that their outsized compensation packages are a measure of their worth, have the
proven “ability to make money while putting on a veneer of loyalty to
the firm.” 133 In this world, the marker of the success is not the quality of
their stewardship or the health of the companies, but the size of
executive bank accounts, 134 accounts they keep when they leave top
125. Stout, supra at note 24, 533.
126. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 46 (2014).
127. Executive Paywatch: High Paid CEOs and the Low Wage Economy, AFL-CIO,
http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014 (last visited June 12, 2015).
128. Dallas, supra note 25.
129. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 50-51.
130. Between 2000 and 2011, CEO tenure declined from about 10 years to 8.4. See Average
Tenure of CEOs Declined to 8.4 Years, the Conference Board Reports, supra note 83.
131. Executives also faced greater risk of dismissals if stock earnings did not increase. See
Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregory D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive
Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 695 (2011) (indicating that CEO
terminations can be linked to share price performance); DAVIS, supra note 3, at 106 (indicating that
the same is true for the CEOs of the largest banks).
132. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 9.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 717-18 (2005) (“CEO pay
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positions after what may be relatively short periods in the CEO chair.
3. The Resurrection of Finance
Reinforcing the change in executive orientation was the increased
importance of finance. A hallmark of the managerial era was the
insulation of large corporations from the need to raise capital by their
ability to finance their own projects through use of retained earnings. 135
Jensen and Meckling argued that not only equity, but debt financing
increased market ability to monitor management performance. 136 Indeed,
in the nineties, Jensen argued that increased debt would speed the
departure of inefficient dinosaurs from the corporate scene. 137 Since the
original Jensen and Meckling article in the seventies, the influence of the
financial system generally has increased.
By the end of the twentieth century, the powerless individual
investors that concerned Berle and Means had largely given way to
institutional investors. The cost of investing in mutual funds had
declined significantly, 138 and when employers began to shift from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans in the eighties, the role of
such funds greatly expanded. 139 The percentage of households with stock
market investments increased from 20% to 52% between 1983 and 2001,
fueling the stock market boom of the nineties. 140 By 2005, three-quarters
of the average large firm’s ownership was in the hands of institutional
investors. 141 These investors, however, have not necessarily played an
outsized role on corporate boards. 142
After 2000, however, mainstream institutional shareholders began
offering backing for hedge fund activists, “which set the stage for hedge
funds to emerge as meaningful governance players.” 143 Brian Cheffins
writes that the hedge funds activists today compel executives in
is the most significant validation and form of recognition a chief executive receives, and high pay is
more salient than other possible measures of a CEO’s success and value to the firm.”).
135. Wells, supra note 2.
136. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 99.
137. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 847 (1993) (“In industry after industry with excess capacity,
managers fail to recognize that they themselves must downsize; instead they leave the exit to others
while they continue to invest. When all managers behave this way, exit is significantly delayed at
substantial cost of real resources to society.”).
138. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 212.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 213.
141. Id.
142. Cheffins, supra note 15, at 427.
143. Id. at 430-31.
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American public corporations to treat shareholder value as an even
higher priority than they did in the late nineties. 144 These investors target
what they see as underperforming companies. 145 They typically acquire a
sizeable holding in a publicly traded company and then agitate for
increased emphasis on increased share prices, stock buybacks, a one-off
dividend payments, or the sale of weak divisions. 146 Sometimes, they
even press for liquidation of the company. 147 Activist influence
increased after the financial crisis, though companies have won some
victories in the courts, 148 and other entities avoid hedge fund influence
by refusing to take their companies public. 149
4. Corporate Culture Remade
These changes have fundamentally remade corporate cultures and
the relationship between top management and the rest of the firm.
The immediate effect is on the identity of a CEO. Top executives
shift from a focus on stewardship of an institution in which they feel a
part to competitors in a tournament in which they are expected to display
their financial prowess. 150 CEOs think of their high pay as a sign of their
success, and seek out the actions that generate high pay as validating
their proficiency, as a necessary part of good management. 151 Troy
Paredes argues that the result breeds overconfidence—and egotism,
hubris, and arrogance. 152 In the managerial era, corporate decisions came
from consensus based procedures. 153 In the new era, new CEOs, often
brought in from outside and paid more than insiders because of their
supposed superiority, can dictate outcomes. 154 The CEO often does so

144. Id. at 419.
145. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75, 80-82 (2011).
146. Id. at 53.
147. Id.
148. Cheffins, supra 15, at 425.
149. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of
“Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011).
150. Ribstein, supra note 8.
151. Paredes, supra note 134, at 717-18.
152. Id. at 675. See also Dallas, supra note 25, at 321 (“Studies show that when power within
an organization becomes more centralized in a CEO, politics within the organization
increases, resulting in the CEO receiving less critical feedback and thus becoming less
accountable.”).
153. Indeed, observers continue to find, as Galbraith did, that “a committee is actually a more
efficient way of running a large and complex modern corporation than relying on a powerful and
charismatic leader.” Dallas, supra note 25, at 322.
154. Paredes, supra note 134, at 686 (emphasizing the CEOs ability to command deference).
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through command of the firm’s internal incentive system, with the
highest bonuses and recognition going to those who advance the CEO’s
agenda. 155 The CEO has a strong incentive to do so in a way that focuses
on short term share prices. Lynne Dallas writes that “[t]he new
managerialism is characterized by . . . corporate decision making that
involves second guessing stock market reactions. This environment
often encourages a short-term focus that ignores the underlying
economic health of the corporation to the detriment of the long-term
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.” 156
Empirical studies confirm the result. Dallas reports that in a 2005
survey of 401 financial executives, they confirmed that they would take
action that decrease the value of their firms to meet earnings
expectations. 157 Over 80% 158 of the executives said they would decrease
discretionary spending, such as advertising expenses, maintenance
expenses, and research and development expenses, to meet earnings
targets. Over 50% 159 would delay a new project to boost apparent
earnings even it added to the firm’s overall expense or otherwise did not

155. Within the corporate law literature, there is substantial disagreement about the relative
roles of the CEO and the Board and the respective power allocated to each of them. This debate,
however, is tangential to the questions presented here. Both CEOs and Boards tend to favor the
emphasis on short term changes in share price, and powerful Boards often tend to increase the
pressure on the CEO to focus primarily if not exclusively on share price. Accordingly, while some
Boards may constrain CEO self-dealing or overt criminality, most contribute to the change in
corporate culture described in this article, even if they have a degree of independence. Moreover,
Boards, which tend to include a mix of executives of other corporations and institutional or activist
investors, often know each other and share similar perspectives and interests even if the CEO did
not choose them. Corporate boards thus tend to reinforce the tendency to see corporations as tools to
advance shareholder interests, and they increase the CEO’s identification not with the company, its
employees, or customers, but with the investor class that dominates corporate boards. The net effect
that CEOs have relatively more power than they did in the managerial era to advance the interests of
shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders and simultaneously less power, in most
corporations, to make decisions that advance long term corporate interests (or the interests of
multiple stakeholders) at the expense of short term share prices because they face increased risk that
they corporate boards will replace them if they do so. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk et
al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 751 (2002) (arguing that the increased power of CEOs vis-à-vis boards explains the increase in
executive compensation), with RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS (2002) (maintaining that independent boards increase
CEO compensation as part of the search for CEOs who will boost share prices for the benefit of
institutional investors). See also DAVIS, supra note 3, at 96-99 (on “American cronyism” and the
tendency of boards to protect their own, even when engaged in wrongdoing).
156. Dallas, supra note 25, at 320-21.
157. Id. at 280 (citing John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting
Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 27-28 (2006)).
158. Id. (citing Graham, supra note 157, at 31).
159. Id. (citing Graham, supra note 157, at 31).
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advance the company’s interests. 160 Nor is the result limited to financial
firms. Another study looked at 6,642 companies during the period from
1986 to 2005. 161 These firms also increased reported earnings by cutting
support for research and development and marketing. 162 Professor
Mizik, who conducted the study of non-financial firms, divided them
into two categories: myopic (because of their focus on only near-term
results) and non-myopic. 163 He found that any initial benefit to
shareholders from the myopic behavior was outweighed by the underperformance of these firms in the following four years. 164 Yet, “contrary
to the efficient market hypothesis,” the firms’ share price did not take
the long (or even medium) term negative effects into account in valuing
share stock prices; instead, it rewarded the myopic behavior if they
produced an increase in reported earnings. 165
The interaction between institutional investors, hedge fund
activists, and corporate management increases the effect. Dallas reports,
that over the last decade, “technological changes and a decline in
transaction costs per trade have fueled an increase in trading volume, an
increase in stock turnover, and a decline in stock holding periods.” 166
From 2005 to 2009, daily trading volume in NYSE-listed stock
increased 181%, from 2.1 billion shares to 5.9 billion shares. 167
Professionally-managed mutual funds trade more frequently than
individual accounts, and hedge funds trade at double the rates of the
mutual funds. 168 It is therefore unsurprising that the average holding
period of stock has significantly declined from seven years in 1960 to
two years in 1992 and seven and one-half months in 2007. 169 For hedge
funds the holding periods are even less. 170 Traders who do not intend to
hold stocks are, in effect, speculating on short term fluctuations in share
price, and managers know that they can boost share prices on at least a
short term basis by manipulating earnings, share buybacks, firm
announcements, and other matters that affect the traders’ beliefs about
the company rather than long term fundamentals. 171
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 280-81.
Id.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 297-98.
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All of these factors increase the incentive to “cheat.” The more that
transient shareholders dominate share ownership, the greater the
likelihood that a firm will misreport financial information and weaken
the firm’s internal controls. 172 Even without outright lying or
misrepresentation, the reorientation of companies toward an emphasis on
short term share prices increases the incentives to take actions that are
not necessarily in the companies’—or the nation’s—interests.
Corporations, for example, have dramatically increased their tendency to
buy back outstanding shares, almost entirely for the purpose of boosting
short term share prices. The result makes the corporation less able or
willing to invest in new facilities or equipment that might boost
production. 173 Companies also have been eager to lay off employees
when the layoffs boost corporate bottom lines, even if the company will
need similar employees in the future and it may cost more to rehire
similar workers later. 174 These actions often have long term negative
consequences for firm health.175 They can contribute to financial
“bubbles,” as a rising market may increase speculative activity and the
temptation to manage earnings even further, 176 which makes financial
markets more volatile. They also lower the quality of the information on
which trades are based.
III. A CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Criminology vs. Economics
The divide between economic and criminological views of the
corporation transcends corporate governance. These broader policy
implications are powerful and, we will argue, immensely destructive.
The shift in the corporate debate from one grounded in facts to one
172. Id. at 305. Indeed, an empirical analysis of different equity based incentives shows that
while this behavior may not be consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis, it is consistent with
the economic theory of crime. See Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan, Jr. & Yisong S. Tian,
Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115,
115 (2009) (Managers with larger linear incentives may be more likely to commit fraud in an
attempt to avoid severe price declines.).
173. William Lazonick calls stock buybacks “weapons of value destruction” and argues
executives who make these corporate allocation decisions use stock buybacks to boost their
companies’ stock prices and manage quarterly earnings “because, through their stock-based pay,
they are personally incentivized to make these allocation decisions.” See William Lazonick, The
Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 888 (2013).
174. For an explanation of these changes, see DAVIS, supra note 3, at 90-91.
175. Dallas, supra note 25, at 305-06.
176. Id.
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based on ideology has undermined the integrity of American
institutions 177 and is central to the change in corporate culture. 178 The
neoclassical economic and criminological views diverge on the
following issues:
First, “markets” are self-correcting absent government
“interference.” Criminology instead looks at the structural factors that
contribute to criminality, whether they come from government or the
private sector. 179 This analysis has been successful in reducing street
crime, and it assumes that the existence of laws—and the government
role in enforcing them—is an important factor in the level of crime and
fraud. 180 Indeed, even defenders of the rational actor model agree that
“fraud destroys markets,” 181 and criminologists tend to see fraud
prevention, like other types of crime prevention, as a matter or
appropriate policing. 182 From this perspective, the reduced role for
financial regulators that preceded the financial crisis was the equivalent
of taking the cops off the beat. 183 George Akerlof received a Nobel Prize
in Economics in large part for a paper showing that the predictable
response to pervasive fraud is a “lemons market” in which the market
“corrects” for fraud by permanently reducing prices in the entire
market—or in other cases destroying the market altogether. 184
Second, regulation is almost certainly unnecessary and harmful.
Indeed, former Federal Chairman Alan Greenspan, who confessed that
he was “blinded by ideology,” in the run up to the financial crisis simply
did not believe in regulation and therefore refused to intervene in the
face of numerous appeals to do something about the predatory lending
177. Berle, for example, co-authored with an economist because it allowed him to present an
empirical analysis of the corporate practices that led to the Great Depression. See BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 1.
178. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 245-46 (describing the cynical belief of corporate executives
that they can create their own realities and boost short term shares prices if they can convince
investors to believe the company’s hype about future prospects).
179. Simpson, supra note 21, at 492.
180. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 27 (comparing community policies strategies with
approaches to white collar crime).
181. See Klock, supra note 23, at 182.
182. See Barkow, supra note 27.
183. See Black, supra note 20, at 993 (2012) (“Each of our recent financial crises has been
triggered by deregulatory efforts that simultaneously remove structural restraints, regulatory
tripwires that deter the development of imprudent (and ultimately fraudulent) practices, and
enforcement resources. I call these the three ‘de’s’: deregulation, desupervision and
decriminalization. The result allows control frauds to grow unchecked.”).
184. See Akerlof, supra note 22, at 489-90 (introducing the lemon analogy in the context of
car sales); DAVIS, supra note 3, at 170 (on the importance of legal and corporate governance
institutions to the existence of stock exchanges).
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and other abuses that contributed to the housing bubble. 185 In contrast,
white-collar criminology sees effective regulation as a tripwire that
identifies and corrects problems before they grow out of control,
contributing to confidence in markets. 186 In this sense, if regulators are
the equivalent of the cops on the beat, regulations are the equivalent of
the traffic laws and the traffic lights kept in good working order.
Third, inequality is highly desirable. Inequality is essential to
ensure that employees and officers have the correct incentives to
excel. 187 Inequality is necessary to produce a “hyper-meritocracy.” 188
Inequality is also vital to limit the CEO’s perverse incentive to loot the
firm or otherwise abuse the shareholders. Indeed, economist Roger
Myrson, in his Nobel lecture, claimed that only CEOs of “great” wealth
are likely not to abuse “their” firms and shareholders. 189 The paramount
defense of economists of modern executive compensation, mentioned
above, is that the dramatic increase in CEO compensation has “aligned”
the interests of the CEO and the shareholders and minimized “agency”
concerns. Instead, the opposite is true. The managerial era, whatever its
limitations, was an era of relative equality that produced a greater
emphasis on one’s reputations within corporate circles.190 Top
executives, while paid well, were not paid that much more than others by
today’s standards. 191 Most studies find, however, that non-monetary
incentives work better than monetary ones in promoting group cohesion
and restraining fraud 192 and that increased emphasis on financial
incentives creates a culture of “greed” that attracts individuals more
likely to believe that they are justified in doing whatever is necessary to

185. See June Carbone, Once and Future Financial Crises: How the Hellhound of Wall Street
Sniffed Out Five Forgotten Factors Guaranteed to Produce Fiascos, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1021, 1053
(2012).
186. See Barkow, supra note 27; WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO
OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY (2013).
187. See,
e.g.,
Iman
Anabtawi, Explaining
Pay
Without
Performance:
The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1590-91 (2005) (explaining some positive
benefits of tournaments in firms).
188. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 24, at 532 (describing views that the relative lack of bonuses
and monetary incentives during the managerial era were hopelessly backward and inefficient).
189. Roger B. Myerson, Prize Lecture: Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic
Theory, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 8, 2007), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/2007/myerson-lecture.html.
190. See Goldin & Margo, supra note 52; Stout, supra note 24, at 532-33 (on corporate
performance during the managerial era).
191. Stout, supra note 24, at 532.
192. See, e.g., AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 69, at 59 (2010); LYNN STOUT,
CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 169 (2010).
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prosper. 193
Fourth, power is not a legitimate subject of economic inquiry. For
economists, the rise of crony capitalism is a political issue. 194 In contrast,
Berle and Means and Galbraith made power a central focus of
analysis. 195 Attitudes toward power help explain a central dilemma in the
corporate governance debate. Those who favor shareholder primacy see
other theories as indeterminate or impractical because of the lack of a
precise standard. 196 On the other hand, those who favor managerialism
want managers to balance various corporate interests. 197 While they may
agree that the standard is less pristine, they wish to equip managers to
push back against other players in the name of the corporation. 198 Rather
than see these other players (such as activist shareholders) as the product
of impersonal market forces, they see the other interests as having
“power” and therefore the ability to rig the rules of the market to
advance their own interests. Today, a primary example may be hedge
fund managers, who have sufficient political clout to have gained
favorable tax treatment of their earnings, who use the combination of
technological advances and regulatory evasion to obscure the nature of
their trading activities, and who have formed the right political and
business alliances to be able to pressure corporate boards and
managers. 199 Shareholder primacy theorists either see the activist
investors as enforcing market discipline or predict that the market will
find ways to counter their activities. Those who analyze the same
developments in terms of power relationships, however, see the hedge
fund managers as acquiring power to advance their own interests at the
expense of others through the combination of tax subsidies that give
them a competitive advantage over unsubsidized entities and the ability
to subvert the transparency on which financial markets have been based
since the passage of the security laws. Without their political power, the
193. For an excellent description of these effects, see Stout, supra note 24, at 553
(“[A]ccording to crowding out theory, . . . associating a particular kind of behavior or interaction
with monetary payments changes the social context, making the interaction look like a market
transaction in which purely selfish behavior is deemed appropriate.”); see id. at 558 (firms that offer
large financial incentive are more likely to attract selfish opportunists).
194. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 96-98 (describing the replication of the small number of
executives controlling American corporations and their relationship to each other).
195. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 196-200 (1952).
196. See discussion infra.
197. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 292-309 (1999) (discussing the nature of directors’ duties).
198. See id.
199. See Cheffins, supra note 15.
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SEC, rather than the market, would reset the rules of the road. Managers
who identified with their companies rather than their offshore bank
accounts might also have been more inclined to oppose the activists. The
balance of competing interests, seen in light of the power relationships,
both underscores the hollow nature of short term share price as an
appropriate measure of firm interests (because the existence of powerful
unregulated entities distorts the markets’ price mechanisms) and
substitutes a different measure of firm interests, one that underscores the
need to be able to strengthen the firm against hostile forces.
Criminology seeks to identify the way these factors create
criminogenic environments that make fraud more likely. Executive
compensation has been a major factor in priming corporate cultures for
fraud. Lynn Stout writes:
Pay-for-performance schemes can create criminogenic environments
that first tempt honest individuals into unethical or illegal behavior,
then invite them to adopt looser views about what is unethical or
illegal in the first place. It is sometimes said in the business world that
pressure makes diamonds. We should bear in mind it also makes
200
felons.

B. The Peace Bridge that Became the Bridge to Nowhere
Prominent economists, lawyers, criminologists, and regulators
knowledgeable about accounting fraud came together in 1993 in a multidisciplinary collaboration that produced the first meaningful economic
model of control fraud. The famous 1993 article by George Akerlof and
Paul Romer had a title that captured the mutual thesis—”Looting: The
Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.” 201 Akerlof and Romer
ended their article with a paragraph addressed to their fellow economists
in order to emphasize their key message to their discipline.
Neither the public nor economists foresaw that the [S&L
deregulations] of the 1980s were bound to produce looting. Nor,
unaware of the concept, could they have known how serious it would
be. Thus the regulators in the field who understood what was
happening from the beginning found lukewarm support, at best, for
their cause. Now we know better. If we learn from experience, history
202
need not repeat itself.

200.
201.
202.
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Stout, supra note 24, at 555.
Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 60.
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Given the prominence of the scholars from multiple disciplines and
the great success of the savings and loan regulators in responding to the
fraud epidemic that drove the second, far more destructive phase of the
debacle, there was real hope that Akerlof and Romer’s work would serve
as a bridge between the economists and the criminologists and financial
regulators. Unfortunately, Akerlof and Romer’s belief that economists
now “know better” proved unduly optimistic. Economists
overwhelmingly ignored the multi-disciplinary collaboration and drove
anti-regulatory policies that “were bound to produce looting.” 203
Effective regulators were replaced with senior anti-regulators who
ignored the warnings of “the regulators in the field who understood what
was happening from the beginning . . . .” 204 The results were
catastrophic.
C. The Productive Development in the Legal Academy—Critiques of
Executive Compensation
Prior to Lehman’s failure, one powerful critique of a central
pathology of the pro-CEO economic policies arose in the legal academy.
The legal academy began to document that the claim that CEOs
designed their compensation systems to “align” their interests with the
shareholders was false. 205 Instead, as we discuss, the data confirmed
criminologists and regulators’ observation that modern executive and
professional compensation was crafted to create perverse incentives that
magnified the propensity of CEOs, other corporate officials, and
“independent” “professionals” to act in criminal and abusive fashions.
Unfortunately, these data did not lead to any change in policy. 206
One of the more remarkable transformations has been Michael
Jensen’s agreement that the modern compensation principles he fathered
have in fact proved counterproductive. 207 Michael Jensen is one of the
world’s best-known finance experts and the intellectual father of modern
executive compensation. 208 In a transformation that is close to unique by
203. Id.; Black, supra note 186.
204. Black, supra note 186.
205. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 24 (describing literature).
206. Id. at 536 (noting that would-be reformers, rather than question the effectiveness of exante financial incentives, have called for recalibration and greater use of incentives).
207. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got
to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 44-45 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 44, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (discussing how equity-based compensation led to
unwise acquisitions, increased risk, aggressive accounting, and even corporate fraud).
208. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much
You Pay, But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990).
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such a prominent scholar, Jensen has become a powerful critic of his
progeny on the grounds that it creates perverse incentives that are so
powerful that they make wealth-minimizing behavior by corporate
officials the norm. 209
The massive number of fraud convictions of elite corporate officers
and accompanying investigations arising from our two prior financial
crises—the savings and loan debacle and the Enron-era frauds—ended
any real debate as to the causes of those crises.210 In the current crisis,
however, the initial assertion by the Obama administration was that
fraud was not a material contributor to the crisis. Pro-CEO economists
and law and economics scholars made the same claim. 211 Most economic
studies failed to even consider fraud.
The claims that the market cannot produce fraud, however, are now
rarely made. Scores of investigations have documented hundreds of
thousands of felonies harming hundreds of trillions of dollars in
transactions. 212 Criminologists have documented the three epidemics of
accounting control fraud (appraisal fraud, liar’s loans, and the fraudulent
sale of fraudulently originated loans through fraudulent “reps and
warranties”) that hyper-inflated the residential real-estate bubble and
drove the financial crisis. We show that younger economists, typically
from very conservative worldviews, have now published a series of
studies confirming the endemic nature of the frauds led by the lenders.213
These studies generally do not investigate why the lenders engage in the
frauds, but the chasm between the criminology and the economics and
law and economics literatures on corporations may be closing.

209. Id.
210. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), 301 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 97; 1990
WL 111608, at 1 (statement of the Hon. Nicholas Mavroules of Massachusetts) (“[T]he savings and
loan scandal has rapidly become a powerful example of flagrant abuse of trust and leadership.
Financial criminals must be brought to justice and their inequities should not be paid for by the
American people.”).
211. Indeed, one of the Republican Commissioners on the Commission charged with
investigating the causes of the financial crisis absolved Wall Street and placed the blame for the
crisis solely on government policies to boost home ownership. See Carbone, supra note 185, at
1052.
COMMISSION,
212. In
particular,
see
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 198, 343 (2011).
213. See, e.g., Johnson, Ryan & Tian, supra note 172 (Managers with larger linear incentives
may be more likely to commit fraud in an attempt to avoid severe price declines.).
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D. The Contribution to the Corporate Debate by Other Academic
Disciplines
Management, accounting, and business ethics scholars also have a
literature that deals with issues and policies that overlap with the matters
that economists, legal scholars, and criminologists research.
Criminologists find each of these contributions to be useful even when
they disagree with the policy views and theories. Business ethicists tend
to stress “tone at the top”—but almost invariably assume implicitly that
the CEO who sets such a tone will set a lawful tone. Management
scholars have an active literature praising narcissism as a positive trait
for a CEO. 214 Criminology has long identified narcissism as
criminogenic.
The accounting literature is also a hidden gem that is too often
ignored by economists and law and economics scholars. 215 It takes fraud
by corporate leaders seriously. Unfortunately, there is very little 216
multi-disciplinary work by economists in collaboration with accountants
or criminologists.
IV. CONCLUSION
Large business enterprises in the United States have been remade as
vehicles designed to enrich senior executives and outside investors who
may hold own stock for relatively short periods. Despite increasing
literature on the negative effects of these changes, no proposals for
reorientation of corporate culture have taken hold. Stout and Blair’s
work in the late nineties has been enormously influential within the
academy, and their critique of corporate practices has been widely
influential, but there is little evidence of a coalition forming to
implement their proposals. Instead, most of the debate remains mired in
the question of which management teams do a better job of raising share
prices rather than creating alternative or more holistic measures of
management performance. The time has come to realize that the solution
214. See, e.g., Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable
Cons, 82 HARV. BUS. REV. 92 (2004).
215. See, e.g., DAIN C. DONELSON, MATTHEW EGE & JOHN M. MCINNIS, INTERNAL CONTROL
WEAKNESSES AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD (2015).
216. See, e.g., PETERSON K. OZILI, FORENSIC ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD: A REVIEW OF
LITERATURE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2015) (summarizing accounting literature and noting its
lack of influence on policy). For recent interdisciplinary explorations of accounting fraud, see David
J. Cooper, Tina Dacin & Donald Palmer, Fraud in Accounting, Organizations and Society:
Extending the Boundaries of Research, 38 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 440 (2013) (discussing need for
research that goes beyond the typical accounting discussion that focused on fraud detection).
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lies not with corporate governance specialists, but with a broader
interdisciplinary examination of human motivation and healthy
communities.
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